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Made in India: An Examination of 
Indian and Dutch Perspectives on 
International Labor Regulation
Sandy Robson
I. Introduction
Although the cobblestone avenues of the shopping district in 
Maastricht, Netherlands, have a uniquely European character, the sti-
lettos and designer jeans behind store windows beckon passersby to 
engage in a truly global phenomenon. It is difficult as a consumer to 
grasp the quantity of goods that pass in and out of Maastricht’s streets 
from oceans away. It is even more problematic to conceive where these 
goods come from—the billions of fingers working under grueling con-
ditions in the corners of nearly every continent, places mentioned only 
in tiny embroidered lettering beneath handling instructions.
As globalization diminishes the economic distance between nations, 
companies are relocating their operations to nations where wages are 
low but social costs are high in terms of labor conditions for work-
ers. This trade-off burdens the Western conscience. Some claim that 
lower labor standards are more acceptable in some cultures than oth-
ers, while critics staunchly believe that universal labor standards are 
the only way to truly protect the world’s workers from exploitation.
A. The Trade/Labor Standards Linkage Debate and the WTO Social 
Clause
The International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations agency 
that brings together governments, employers, and workers of its mem-
ber states to promote decent working conditions,1 has established hun-
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dreds of conventions elaborating legal protections for workers. Four 
rights that have emerged as particularly important have been labeled 
the ILO “core standards.” These include:
•  the right to organize and bargain collectively
•  the prohibition of forced labor
•  the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, 
etc.
•  the prohibition of child labor2
Unfortunately, these standards lack an effective enforcement mech-
anism. As a result, some believe that international bodies should put 
“teeth” into the standards by incorporating them into trade agree-
ments. In theory, the fear of losing export opportunities would pres-
sure governments into strengthening labor regulation.
It has been suggested that the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the global institution created to facilitate predictable and free trade 
through international agreements,3 should address labor standards in 
its rules. The proposed WTO “social clause” would allow importing 
nations to prohibitively tax goods made in countries that do not con-
form to the ILO core labor standards.4 The issue has proven highly 
controversial.5
A rough sketch of the argument depicts industrialized nations and 
their unions championing the social clause, claiming that it would 
prevent poor countries from weakening labor regulations in order to 
attract foreign investment (a “race to the bottom”). Developing nations 
protest that linking standards to trade would deny them of their com-
parative advantage in labor, thus crippling their economies and throw-
ing even more people into poverty than before.
The trade versus labor standards linkage debate lies at the cross-
roads of morality and economics. Are our commitments to equality 
as flexible as a globalized economy obliges them to be? Should indus-
trialized countries impose working standards on developing nations 
through trade policies?
B. The Macalester Maastricht Experience
The Macalester Maastricht study abroad program has given me an 
excellent opportunity to examine people’s stance on the linkage ques-
tion. In the fall of 2006, I spent five weeks studying development in 
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Jaipur, India, and two months at an internship with a grassroots com-
munity organization in rural Rajasthan. Then I spent a semester in the 
Netherlands—reputedly a country with the strongest of national moral 
compasses. I completed a one-month seminar on globalization, as 
well as two classes entitled, Globalization and Inequality, and Human 
Rights. Over the summer, I interviewed a number of people associated 
with labor and trade intergovernmental organizations while partici-
pating in another program in Geneva, Switzerland. These classes gave 
me the chance to examine both countries’ attitudes toward labor equal-
ity, both academically and experientially.
This study will examine the phenomenon of cultural perspectives 
on international labor standards. I will interpret the opinions of Indian 
and Dutch stakeholders concerning the linkage of universal labor stan-
dards to trade. In order to narrow my focus, I have used the WTO 
social clause as a frame of reference.
Section II will consider the pro-linkage or anti-linkage opinions 
of various Indian stakeholders, including non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs), unions, businesses, and the government. For each 
stakeholder group I will separately consider the ideological and the 
economic justifications for their positions. Section III will repeat the 
process for the parallel stakeholder groups in the Netherlands/Europe. 
Section IV will interpret the responses of key international bodies, 
while Section V will conclude by stating how my experience through 
the Maastricht program has changed my perspective on universal 
labor standards. I will draw on my research, classes, and experience 
throughout.
I have elected not to compare the application of labor standards in 
India to their application in the Netherlands. This discussion would 
only further emphasize the inequality between the two. It is more use-
ful to examine how the Indians and the Dutch each seek to remedy this 
inequality.
My account is not perfectly balanced between experiential and aca-
demic evidence. In India I found that despite my lack of access to for-
mal resources, I learned much through my contact with others. In the 
Netherlands I had entire libraries at my disposal, and I intentionally 
sought out the opinions of NGOs, companies, and union organizers. 
This essay does not argue for or against the social clause, nor does it 
attempt to explain each culture as a whole. My goal, rather, is to dis-
cern where and why the views of the Indians and Dutch converge or 
diverge in the social clause debate.
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II. India
Although Indian NGOs, unions, corporations, and government agen-
cies all tend to have radically different opinions on matters of economic 
development, they exhibited remarkable unanimity in their opposition 
to the social clause when it was first introduced. The political left, right, 
and center, as well as India’s main business associations, all expressed 
appreciation for the government’s steadfast resistance to the inclusion 
of “non-trade issues” at the Seattle ministerial of the WTO in 1999. 
Perhaps more surprisingly, the Center for Indian Trade Unions and 
the closely affiliated Communist Party of India-Marxist both encour-
aged the government to keep the labor question out of WTO regula-
tions.6 Why was there such agreement between historically conflicting 
groups?
A. Many Indian NGOs Oppose the Linkage of Trade and Labor 
Standards
1. Ideological Perspective: Swadeshi Preference for the Local
My fall internship was with a small organization called Lok ShikShan 
(LSS) in the village of Bhadesar, Rajasthan. LSS did everything from 
assisting construction workers in demanding the minimum wage 
to helping “lower” castes retain their traditional agricultural lands. 
Its functions were united by the goal of motivating the lower castes 
(referred to as Dalits, or “the trampled upon”) to organize themselves 
to secure their own rights. Nearly all of the LSS staff came from the 
lower castes of the immediate area.
In LSS staff meetings the principle of swadeshi was sometimes 
referred to as a justification for its commitment to the local commu-
nity. This idea has characterized the thinking of certain Indian social 
activists for more than a century, and was a key part of M.K. Gandhi’s 
philosophy in the movement for independence. Swadeshi encourages 
a preference for the local over the remote in every aspect of life, par-
ticularly the economy. The market is seen as an instrument to meet the 
needs of the community, and under no circumstances should it become 
a “master of the people.” The more closely related people are to their 
employers and customers, the more control they have over their own 
lives. The outside economy should be engaged only for needs that 
cannot be met by one’s neighbors.7 Likewise, political control ought to 
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be kept local in order to give people the maximum influence over the 
laws that govern them.
The idea of a global market has no place in swadeshi philosophy. The 
swadeshi worldview dictates, “let a thousand markets bloom—and not 
merge into one global market.”8 For Western free-trade advocates, this 
translates into a romanticized form of “protectionism,” but for these 
Rajasthani activists, local economies are the best way to ensure that 
people can defend their own interests. Thus LSS, in addition to many 
other Indian NGOs, is resistant to the increasing distance between 
producers and consumers, as well as to the imposition of global labor 
standards from above.
2. Economic Perspective: Tariffs could do More Harm than Good
Even for Indians who do believe in the idea of international stan-
dards, the country’s economic circumstances make some of them reluc-
tant to promote enforcement through the WTO. They fear the adverse 
effects that prohibitive tariffs might have on India’s poor. Pratham, 
a Jaipur-based NGO devoted to education, sees the rehabilitation of 
India’s fifty-million child laborers9 as an intrinsic part of its mission. 
Pratham’s strategy is to establish informal schools in the unoccupied 
spaces of poor neighborhoods. Children are given a free meal each 
day to encourage attendance. Since the fall of 2006, Pratham has been 
working to implement the federal government’s Abolition of Child 
Labor Act, which in some areas offers parents a sum of approximately 
100 rupees (US$2.46) per week in exchange for their child’s school 
attendance.
However, Pratham director Kulbushan Kothari notes that this sum 
is not enough to keep children out of the factories. As soon as parents 
notice that the quality of education at these makeshift schools is not 
adequate, they encourage their children to go back to work where 
they can receive as much as 400 rupees (US$9.86) per week. “With-
out an alternative, quality source of income or education,” says Mr. 
Kothari, “the children are forced to turn to trash-picking or prostitu-
tion—an outcome that no children’s rights advocate would consider or 
desire.”10
It is significant that Pratham’s method for abolishing child labor 
does not involve sending inspectors to factories, forcing managers to 
expel child employees, or shutting down operations. What is needed, 
say Indian NGOs, is more resources to improve education and com-
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pensate children for their time, as well as to create jobs for those who 
finish primary school.11
If developed nations impose taxes on certain Indian products, the 
Indian economy would be penalized for not meeting norms they are 
already trying to enforce through other means. In the view of many 
poverty relief organizations, the proposed WTO social clause would 
do more harm than good.
B. Indian Unions Shift Position on Linkage
1. Ideological Perspective: Marxism and Anti-Westernism
Indian unions have a close relationship with the Communist Party of 
India-Marxist, and both agree that labor standards ought to be kept 
out of WTO regulations. Why would a party with the slogan “Work-
ers of the World Unite” be against a global mechanism for enforcing 
labor standards? RamRai Bheel, a self-declared Marxist from Bhade-
sar, explained that communism has found an ideological foothold in 
India because in the past so many people have been ruled by so few—
whether by the upper-caste landowners or by the British Raj.12 One 
of Marx’s core concepts is that those in positions of advantage always 
strive to ensure that worldviews reinforcing their status are widely 
accepted, particularly by the lower classes.13 For this reason, held Ram-
Rai, some Indian Marxists are suspicious that moral positions originat-
ing in the West are attempts to retain the economic upper hand.
Khemraj Prakash, LSS’s founder, is another staunch Marxist with 
considerable experience in labor organizing. When I first arrived, he 
scoffed at the human rights organizations on my résumé. To him, 
“human rights” are silly expressions of Western ideals that rarely 
accomplish genuine change. He frowned at my “infatuation” with 
them, and instead insisted that, “whatever standards are imposed 
ought to be imposed by the people themselves.”14
Bennet D’Costa, the president of the All-India Conference of Unile-
ver Unions,15 has deemed all kinds of corporate monitoring initiatives 
as “complete rubbish…a Westernized idea of today…it is culturally 
biased and ideologically biased…One strong union can establish more 
than one hundred government inspectors.”16
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2. Economic Perspective: Fears of Western Protectionism give way to 
Fear of Jobs Lost to China
The leaders of national unions echo this sentiment when they assert 
that core labor standards in WTO rules represent nothing but thinly 
disguised self-interest and protectionism on the part of Western indus-
try. They strongly suspect that the inclusion of labor standards in WTO 
rules would benefit Western industry by diverting production to places 
where labor regulation is already strong: Europe, the United States, 
and other developed nations. In the words of the Indian activist Van-
dana Shiva, “social clauses make bed-fellows of Northern unions and 
their corporations to jointly police and undermine social movements in 
the South.”17
About 92% of the Indian workforce is employed in the informal sec-
tor, and most multinational corporations (MNCs) buy products from 
home-workers and home-growers. This presents very few avenues to 
collectively bargain for labor standards, and poses an enormous chal-
lenge in terms of monitoring child and bonded labor, and discrimina-
tory hiring practices.18 The majority of laborers I interviewed during 
my time in India were unaware that they were subject to domestic 
labor laws. Even if they were cognizant of the international legal struc-
ture, illiterate field workers with little access to legal resources would 
probably not be in a much better position to assert their rights.
Over the past decade, however, India has begun to lose jobs to 
places like China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, where many workers are 
not only underpaid but severely abused. Indian unions have begun 
to acknowledge the need for an international minimum standard of 
treatment, but only if these standards do not dictate wages or working 
hours. “Things have changed,” said one union representative, “at first 
[Indian trade unions] were worried that the social clause would deal 
with wages, which translates into lost jobs and investment. Now there 
isn’t so much opposition [to the social clause] as it has been specified 
that the clause deals with other fundamental issues.”19
C. Indian Companies’ Anti-Linkage Perspective
1. Ideological Perspective: “Begar” Practices in the Caste System
The caste system in India has traditionally involved a power dynamic 
referred to as begar, which obligates Dalits to perform certain tasks that 
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are considered polluting and therefore cannot be performed by the 
“purer” upper castes. Dalits are expected to remove human and animal 
waste, work with leather, eliminate pests, and so on, without payment. 
According to some NGOs, this belief is the origin and justification 
for contemporary forms of labor exploitation.20 Although the Indian 
constitution bans caste discrimination and guarantees lower castes a 
certain percentage of seats in government legislatures, the caste system 
continues to dominate social relations. The effective implementation 
of a clause abolishing discrimination on the basis of caste would run 
completely counter to the way in which communities have been divid-
ing labor for centuries.
A friend of my host family, a wholesale rice distributor, would 
sit at his desk as his employees lugged 15-kilogram bags of basmati 
through the warehouse for less than 80 rupees (US$1.73) per day. He 
maintained a friendly relationship with them, and neither they nor he 
seemed uncomfortable with the disparity between them, even when 
word got around that one employee could not afford his daughter’s 
medical bills. According to my host father, the friend had his position 
in life and they had theirs. There was nothing to be done but “accept 
the circumstances and move on.”21
2. Economic Perspective: Indian Manufacturers do not have the 
Resources to Implement Regulations
In a number of trades like the garment industry, Indian manufacturers 
work on contract and do not receive the profits of the final mark-up 
offered in the nations to which the goods are exported. Factory owners 
complain that their clients (often MNCs) do not pay them enough for 
the goods they produce, and thus they can’t cover the costs of imple-
menting labor regulations. Putting in more toilets, improving ventila-
tion, and so forth, are expensive improvements that cannot be made 
when they can barely afford to pay their workers a minimum wage.22
Shatadru Chattopadhayay, of the Center for Education and Com-
munication in New Delhi, underscores the need to apply different 
standards to MNCs than to Indian small businesses. MNCs have the 
resources to implement safety regulations and raise wages, says Chat-
topadhayay, but small businesses could be completely debilitated by 
new regulations.23
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D. Indian Government Opposes Linkage
1. Ideological Perspective: New Standards from the West are 
Redundant
Although poverty runs rampant in Indian society, development issues 
dominate political conversation. The Hindu newspaper covers as many 
labor-related government programs in one day as many mainstream 
European ones do in a month. The long-reigning Hindu nationalist 
party (BJP) was voted out of power in 2004 because it mainly repre-
sented the interests of the rich upper castes.24
India is a member of the ILO, but opposes the enforcement of the 
core standards by the WTO. The government has already established 
dozens of laws relating to the core standards, including bans on forced 
labor, bans on child labor, articulations of trade union rights, and non-
discrimination statutes. The imposition of further international regula-
tions seems redundant. In a country with a demonstrated commitment 
to improving social equality, the notion that government officials need 
external incentives to motivate them to care for their fellow citizens is 
understandably objectionable.
2. Economic Perspective: A Genuine Lack of Resources for Regulation 
Enforcement
India has been underserved by progressive trade agreements in the 
past. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, the anti-subsidy dump-
ing agreements, and the Special and Differential Treatment provisions 
of the WTO’s Uruguay rounds were all initially accepted as benevolent 
steps forward, but India has yet to reap the benefits.25
If the government is currently unable to meet its own labor stan-
dards, then prohibitive tariffs would indubitably make things worse 
by shrinking the resources available to implement them. Robert Jen-
kins says that the Indian government will be economically unable to 
conform to international standards until “the West agrees to put its 
money where its mouth is…Simply stepping up enforcement of India’s 
already strong laws…will yield little unless funds are provided on a 
very large scale, and on a regular and predictable basis.”26
India’s treatment of debt bondage is a prime example. The ILO and 
the United Nations Committee for Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) have repeatedly condemned India’s failure to protect 
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the rights of the estimated forty million bonded laborers within its 
borders.27 However, the Indian constitution bans bonded labor in six 
different articles, as well as four different acts specifically abolishing 
the practice.28 Debt bondage and related employment issues have been 
the focus of the government’s Five-Year Plans (periodic strategies for 
development) since 1985, and several schemes for releasing and reha-
bilitating bonded laborers have been introduced. India is not in short 
supply of laws and regulation—what it needs is the resources neces-
sary to implement them.
III. The Netherlands and Europe
In Europe, key players have been unable to reach consensus on the 
WTO social clause. The Dutch and European Union (EU) governing 
structures are weighing the moral claims of consumers against the 
regions’ economic circumstances, and Dutch liberal values clash with 
the overall EU governing structure. The Clean Clothes Campaign, a 
coalition of NGOs and unions with the aim of eliminating the unethi-
cal treatment of workers in the garment industry, found it necessary 
to entirely abandon the social clause as a strategy because of the con-
flict it generated among its members.29 Where do Europeans stand on 
global standards?
A. Many Dutch/European NGOs Oppose Linkage
1. Ideological Perspective: ILO Core Standards Do Not Go Far Enough
Many of the European NGOs I encountered have very strong humanist 
views. They do not hesitate to advocate changes that have direct eco-
nomic impacts on companies, and often aim higher than the ILO core 
standards. For example, when the Netherlands-based Consultancy 
and Research for Environmental Management (CREM) conducted a 
study of Dutch multinationals with operations in India, they inquired 
about the four core standards, and also added the issues of security of 
employment and the assurance of a living wage.30 This demonstrates 
a resolute commitment to human welfare in the face of the toughest 
arguments of companies concerning their needs to keep wages low 
and contracts flexible.
On our seminar’s excursion to The Hague, James J. Busuttil, of 
Global Human Rights Defense, elaborated on contemporary human 
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rights discourse. When asked about what has been done in Asia, he 
said that it was “close to nothing.” By referring strictly to the interna-
tional legal framework, he was subscribing to the Euro-centrism that 
my Indian friends so resented.
2. Economic Perspective: A More Specific Instrument is Necessary
Many European NGOs exclude the WTO social clause from their strat-
egies and advance the enforcement of standards through other means. 
Some advocate for corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, in 
which governments, shareholders, and customers pressure individual 
companies into conforming to mutually established guidelines. Unlike 
a tariff on a country’s industry, this method distinguishes responsible 
companies from exploitive ones, and allows for more industry-specific 
codes of conduct. For example, the India Committee of the Nether-
lands compiled the “Ambedkar Principles,” a guide for MNCs with 
operations in India to combat caste discrimination, which is insuffi-
ciently addressed by international institutions.31
B. Dutch/European Unions Support Linkage
1. Ideological Perspective: Equal Standards for All
Annie Watson is the Trade Union Coordinator for the Ethical Trading 
Initiative (ETI), a London-based alliance of NGOs, corporations, and 
unions, which promotes corporate codes of conduct covering supply-
chain working conditions.32 Watson has been working with unions 
from nearly every continent for more than twenty years. Watson says 
that unions find it difficult to work with NGOs, which face far fewer 
operational constraints. Union decision-making is bureaucratic due to 
their representative structures and the facts that they must answer to 
stricter law and are expected to operate on the dues of their members 
without the help of the outside funding available to NGOs.33
Standards proposed by unions are even more demanding than 
those established by NGOs. The ETI has also determined norms for 
corporations. Theirs include all of the ILO and CREM standards men-
tioned above, but also support the right to freely choose employment, 
the right to safe and hygienic working conditions, the right to decent 
working hours, the right to regular employment, and the prohibition 
of harsh or inhumane treatment.34 This lengthy list demonstrates an 
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allegiance to workers’ overall lifestyles and reveals the sentiment that 
all people deserve the same high standards in working conditions.
In the eyes of labor loyalists, another imperfect tool in the hands of 
unions is better than no tool at all. A union member from Portsmouth, 
England, who had been heavily involved in U.K. labor politics, was 
furious that I even questioned the value of the WTO social clause. In 
his eyes, it translated into greatly needed leverage for unions; and in 
any question of labor, “more power should go to unions—not bureau-
crats.”35
2. Economic Perspective: The Race to the Bottom
Bill Jordan, president (1995–2002) of the 130-million-member Interna-
tional Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), summed up the 
trade union’s economic side of the argument in an interview:
a world driven by competition means that those that can undercut their 
competitors through low wages and poor conditions will take the jobs, 
but they will be jobs which cannot be defended in terms of a decent soci-
ety. To prevent this, you need a minimum set of standards [for] all the 
countries that want to benefit from the [social clause]…India, which has 
set itself against the social clause, will soon discover that its cheap labor 
will be no match for the price of products that come from China’s regi-
mented and abused workforce. There’s a simple reason for this: however 
cheap India’s products are, they carry the cost of freedom.36
Unions are not demanding that all goods coming from countries 
with questionable practices should be taxed. The social clause would 
permit importing nations to merely flex their economic muscles. Some 
bilateral trade agreements already contain social clauses that are used 
as threats, even if the tax trigger is never actually pulled. Watson con-
tends that this may be the way to apply pressure on the governments 
of developing nations without the dire economic consequences of tar-
iffs.37
Watson holds that guaranteeing the right to organize is the best way 
to see that the context-specific needs of workers are met. Women work-
ers may campaign for separate toilet facilities and agricultural workers 
may ask for safety equipment. Perhaps most importantly, each group 
can ask for pay that is sufficient for life in their specific locations, thus 
avoiding the economic complications of setting international minimum 
wages.38
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C. Dutch/European Multinational Corporations’ Anti-Linkage 
Perspective
1. Ideological: Some Regulations are Not Practical in India
In the aforementioned study of twenty-one Dutch MNCs with opera-
tions in India, managers responded to queries about the ILO core stan-
dards. None of the companies had workers that were represented by 
unions. A number of managers held that Indian unions are closely 
affiliated with political parties and therefore susceptible to corruption. 
Some MNCs claim that their “open culture” encourages employees 
to express problems to their managers. They regret that this is much 
more difficult to accomplish in India because the working class is far 
less assertive than that of the Netherlands. Others explained that cer-
tain sectors have very low rates of unionization due to a high percent-
age of uneducated workers.39
The leather industry, for example, is notoriously exploitative because 
working with decaying animals is relegated to the lowest castes. 
Because lower castes tend to have less education and are inclined to 
accept injustice, they are said to be less likely to form unions. It is 
thus necessary, say some companies, for employers to take responsibil-
ity for their workers’ welfare instead of waiting for them to organize 
themselves.
2. Economic: MNC Managers are Too Far Removed from Production 
Processes to Implement Change
The complexity of supply chains separates MNC managers from pro-
duction processes. Some feel that managers know so little about their 
suppliers that they cannot enforce standards. The Dutch manager of 
the leather company mentioned above was aware of neither the health 
risks nor the cultural implications connected to work in tanneries in 
India.40
Because in India large companies typically buy from small compa-
nies, spheres of influence are not clear. MNCs do not want to be held 
responsible for the actions of every supplier. Helping a single factory 
meet labor regulations can be a mammoth task involving everything 
from the installation of ventilation to organizing cafeteria workers.41
The costs associated with labor regulation are cited as an obstacle 
to the implementation of labor standards. A few companies with large 
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profit margins may be capable of taking on the costs of demands by 
workers for safety precautions or monitoring mechanisms, but some 
small, labor-intensive businesses may not be able to afford it. One 
manager who participated in the study said that, “some of the prin-
ciples behind ethical trade are aspirational goals, in some countries in 
particular, and can be very difficult to achieve.”42
D. Dutch Government supports Linkage
1. Ideological: Weighing the Social Concerns of Dutch Consumers
Socioeconomic issues prove particularly difficult to resolve on behalf 
of a population as affluent yet as socially conscious as the Dutch. The 
government of the Netherlands has been commended for consistently 
surpassing the 0.7% of GDP target for international aid every year since 
1975.43 It organized the 1997 Amsterdam Conference on Child Labor, 
and has committed more than 32 million Euros (US$47.2 million) to the 
Decent Work Agenda’s initiatives to combat child labor through educa-
tion and poverty reduction.44 The Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs even 
funds research on business and human rights issues.45
Dutch consumers also support improved labor conditions, and the 
government is wary of consumer activism. Because the government 
is seeking further trade liberalization, officials fear that consumers 
will boycott products of questionable origin. In an interview with 
labor advocates from overseas, Agnes van Ardenne, Dutch Minister of 
Development Cooperation, emphasized the importance of consumers 
in labor debates.46
2. Economic: The EU has Recognized Corporate Social Responsibility 
as Good for Business
European nations compose 22 of the 30 members in the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the global insti-
tution devoted to promoting the growth of world trade in addition 
to development for other nations.47 In a resolution of July 2005, the 
European Parliament recommended that the Commission extend the 
scope of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, a labor 
standard-setting document, from foreign investment to trade. The Par-
liament recommended creating EU-level mechanisms to prosecute any 
EU-based importers that allow the violation of core ILO conventions in 
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any part of their supply chain. For better or for worse, these develop-
ments do indicate a trend toward linking trade and labor standards in 
the future.48
However, if corporate social responsibility guidelines are non-bind-
ing, easily met, or poorly monitored, they merely serve as way for 
corporations to boost their reputations. In 2004 the European Multi-
Stakeholder Forum, a coalition of businesses, NGOs, and unions 
involved in CSR, called upon the EU to take the lead in creating an 
effective European CSR framework. According to the European Coali-
tion for Corporate Justice, the EU’s response, entitled the “European 
Alliance on CSR,” consulted no one but the business community.
The initiative is therefore suited to become a major greenwash opera-
tion, and thereby poses a threat to serious CSR initiatives that have 
been evolving all over the world… . there are many cases involving 
some of the most well-known European companies in the Alliance that 
are under scrutiny by civil society organizations for violations of basic 
human, social and environmental rights. For example, Bayer, BP, Shell, 
and Nestle.49
This suggests that the EU governing structure has thus far failed to use 
CSR in a way that serves the best interests of the global poor.
IV. Global Institutions
As globalization has intensified, international institutions have cre-
ated tools to moderate its impact on workers. The key instruments 
include the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises established by 
the OECD,50 the 2000 United Nations Global Compact, and the “UN 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights,” established by 
the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights.51 The principles in these documents all reflect rights outlined 
by ILO conventions, but they all lack an effective enforcement mecha-
nism. Currently, the only viable solution is to create trade agreements 
that discriminate against actors who do not comply; hence, the WTO 
social clause debate.
Keith Griffin, a University of California professor of economics with 
significant experience in development work, believes that there should 
be no overlapping jurisdictions between global institutions, and that 
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“confusion about responsibilities favors the rich and powerful coun-
tries that can play one organization against another in a process of 
divide and rule…undesirable labor practices should be modified in all 
industries where the undesirable practice occurs, and not just in those 
industries which happen to be exporting the product.”52
Lee Swepston, the ILO’s Senior Adviser on Human Rights Stan-
dards and Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work Sector, reported 
in a lecture that ILO constituents have taken the position that, “putting 
restrictions on trade is not productive” in securing workers’ rights. He 
believes that a social clause is politically infeasible.53
Much of the political impasse seems to be focused on the charac-
ter of the WTO itself. I had the privilege of speaking with Alfredo 
Sfeir-Younis, former director of the Geneva office of the World Bank, 
when he visited Maastricht University. Dr. Sfeir-Younis served as the 
World Bank’s Special Representative to the U.N. and the WTO from 
1996 to 1999. As a result, he is of the strong opinion that economists 
should never be responsible for implementing human rights norms. 
He explains, “The WTO is composed of free-trade economists who 
are by nature not predisposed to deal with issues of human rights. For 
years, many people working for the WTO have regarded human rights 
as out of its sphere of responsibility.”54
However, others believe that because WTO law is egalitarian and 
has a high rate of compliance, a justly implemented social clause could 
improve working conditions in poor countries. One lawyer, who 
provides legal opinions and support to developing nations in WTO 
dispute settlement cases, believes that the WTO has been wrongly 
characterized as a “free trade regime,” because the system incorpo-
rates numerous exceptions. The treaty that led to the creation of the 
WTO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), allows 
members to deviate from free-trade principles to “protect public mor-
als,” “protect human, animal, and plant life or health,” and to “stop 
trade in products of prison labor.”55
Stuart Robinson, who has worked in the secretariat of the GATT/ 
WTO for more than twenty years, agrees that a clause “absolutely 
could improve working conditions.” The social clause seems to have 
fallen in the list of priorities, but as diplomats acknowledge its poten-
tial, he says, “it will come back.”56
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V. Lessons of the Maastricht Experience
As I boarded the plane for India last fall, I anticipated an experience 
that would further cement my ideals. I expected to witness the vast 
inequality between the junk-pickers of Jaipur and the mall-pickers of 
Maastricht, and to return to America championing equal labor stan-
dards for all. I would strengthen my commitment to human rights 
oriented anti-sweatshop ethics. I instead returned with a respect for 
the importance of open-mindedness in idealism. Emotional responses 
to injustice can lead us to articulate demands in strong language that 
sweeps across cultures and calls out to our common humanity—and 
sometimes underestimates humanity’s essential incongruities. Those 
unions that insist on global labor standards intend to better the lot of 
others by articulating in writing the ideals of equality. But is nominal 
equality inherently valuable? Is the gap between the workers of indus-
trialized nations and those of the developed world really what we seek 
to eliminate?
In his book entitled, One World: The Ethics of Globalization, Peter 
Singer argues that my previous preoccupation with the “gap” between 
rich and poor was an imprecise endeavor:
Inequality is not significant in itself. It matters because of the impact it 
has on welfare…So the more important issue about the opening up of 
world trade may be whether it has made the world’s poor worse off than 
they would otherwise have been, not relative to the rich, but in absolute 
terms.57
I do not believe that we should prioritize the universal ideal of equal-
ity at all costs. In this case, enforcing equality through trade could be 
counterproductive. In my opinion, we should first prioritize the secur-
ing of the most basic standards for India’s workers, regardless of how 
far behind Western nations they might trail. We first must undertake 
the cause of concretely ensuring standards and alleviating poverty 
before focusing on the way things “should be” through international 
regulations.
However, this shift in values must not translate into indifference or 
apathy. Nor should cultural relativism keep conscientious individuals 
from condemning injustice. It is commonly held that the Netherlands 
is superior to the United States in terms of equitable social policies and 
societal attitudes. This notion kept me from recognizing the flaws of 
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some Dutch people, who easily shrug off the sins professed by their 
clothing tags, and whose resentment of the poor (who “deserve what 
they get”) is eerily similar to the attitude of the upper castes in India.58
Instead of enforcing the International Labor Organization’s stan-
dards through trade agreements, we should concentrate on creating 
an effective enforcement mechanism to monitor the labor practices 
of individual businesses worldwide. The standards laid out by the 
United Nations to accomplish this are admirable, but more research 
and resources should be devoted to ensuring that these principles are 
followed.
Our seminar in Maastricht enabled me to situate these thoughts 
within a broader conceptual tension between structure and agency. 
The “structure” school of thought leads to the perception of globaliza-
tion as an independent force that shapes the outcome of everything 
from trade agreements to consumer habits. I now find myself squarely 
on the “agency” side of the debate. Every business deal and every 
regulation are decided by a human being with a face and a name. 
Trade liberalization happens one shipment at a time; labor oppression 
happens one worker at a time; and consumer culture manifests itself 
one Pepsi at a time. Because everyone can weigh social costs against 
economic benefits, we owe it to humanity to hold ourselves account-
able for actions that affect the world’s poor. •
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